ABSTRACT
The Arab-African alliance, largely created in the heat of the 1973–7 4 oil crisis and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, now remains more a marriage of convenience than the great and indissoluble bond of friendship its founders had hoped it would become. Arab aid in various forms have been generous. The devastating impact of high oil prices on the sub-Saharan non-oil producing developing countries is difficult to capture in the bald statistics usually presented as evidence. The vast bulk of Arab petrodollar surpluses have been invested in European and North American commercial ventures or in liquid assets available on loan through Eurodollar, private and public international banks, and Arab-led investment, banking and insurance consortia. The Israelis appear in no hurry to reopen their embassies in Africa and Israel’s African collaborators like things as they are because it preserves the illusion of the alliance with the Arabs and enables them to continue to receive Arab aid.
