ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has now been in force for 50 years. The upcoming Treaty Review Conference, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, will likely see intensified debate about the relationship between disarmament and deterrence. Nuclear deterrence, of course, pre-dated the NPT and its influence was widely, if warily, acknowledged during treaty negotiations. Aiken introduced a series of resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly between 1958 and 1961, the so-called Irish Resolutions, which evolved into the ‘guiding concept’ for the NPT. Both the US and Soviet Union warmed to the notion of a non-proliferation treaty largely because of deterrence calculations. For them, nuclear deterrence could be simplified and bolstered to the extent that it remained largely a bipolar affair. It is self-evident that in allowing certain states to continue possessing nuclear weapons, the NPT accepts deterrence as the chief purpose for such weapons.
