ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of a great conflict, the prospects for a functional international order often require the ‘assimilation’ of the defeated powers into a revised, stable relationship with the victors. Successful assimilation requires that the victors guarantee the core national interests of the vanquished, who, in turn, must renounce their earlier pretensions and accept a diminished, although respectable, status. Subsequent to their narrow victory in the First Punic War, the Romans failed to assimilate Carthage and thus faced a resurgent power preparing for a second trial of strength. At the Congress of Vienna, France was successfully assimilated into the Concert of Europe, and despite Napoleon Bonaparte’s Hundred Days and defeat at Waterloo, the Vienna settlement essentially held. France never again attempted a revolutionary attack on the broad European peace. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 failed to assimilate Germany, which renewed its assault on the European order 14 years later. The Americans, having learned the lessons of that failure, successfully assimilated both West Germany and Japan after the Second World War; this success was a necessary condition for America’s Cold War victory over its Soviet enemy. 1
