ABSTRACT
On 1 July 1911 the German cruiser Panther dropped anchor in the Moroccan port of Agadir. The international crisis which followed thrust Tripoli upon Italy’s attention even more forcibly than William ITs landing at Tangier in 1905. Only three weeks earlier, San Giuliano had repeated in the chamber that Italy’s policy was ‘the maintenance of the territorial status quo and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire’. 1 Now, after hearing the news from Agadir, he told his subordinates in the Foreign Ministry, ‘The hour of Tripoli draws near for Italy’, and instructed the newly appointed consul to be prepared ‘to be the last consul at Tripoli’. 2 There was one powerful argument against action: an attack on Tripoli might precipitate attacks on Turkey by the Balkan states, with consequent risk of a European war and inevitable damage to Italy’s relations with Austria. On the other hand San Giuliano realised that the Moroccan crisis, the state of Italian opinion and Turkey’s continued obstructiveness at Tripoli would probably force Italy to act within a few months. He therefore urged rapid and intensive military preparations. These might intimidate the Turks and induce them to be more conciliatory. If not, Italy would be in a position to strike a crushing blow and present Europe with a fait accompli. Giolitti did not disagree in substance, but he insisted on waiting until the storm over Agadir had subsided. 3 The nationalists meanwhile intensified their agitation. Even the moderate press called for action and the public was soon in no mood for half measures. ‘Tripoli must be ours or we will suffocate’, wrote the nationalist Bevione on 1 August. 4 By the middle of Sentemher an agreement between France and Oermanv seemed likely, whereby Morocco would become a French protectorate and Germany receive compensation in west Africa. The government decided to act without delay.
