ABSTRACT
Victory was greeted with an outburst of exultation and national pride. ‘It is a Roman victory’, Orlando declared, for only in Roman history could another example of such a victory be found. 1 Such magnification of a victory that needed no magnification betrayed Italian sensitiveness to the suggestion that Italy had won only through Austria-Hungary’s internal collapse. ‘The Austrian revolution was the result, not the cause, of military defeat’, Diaz told the press on 1 December. 2 There were urgent reasons for belittling the revolt of the subject nationalities, for even before the armistice had been signed, the friction between Italians and Yugoslavs had flared up into open conflict. On 29 October the Yugoslav National Council at Zagreb had proclaimed the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and their desire for union with Serbia. The Emperor Charles recognised the Council on the 31st and handed over to it the Austro-Hungarian fleet, already paralysed by mutiny. That same night two Italian officers penetrated Pola harbour and sank the enemy flagship, Viribus Unitis, unaware that it was already in Yugoslav hands. The Yugoslav committee in Pola thereupon appealed to the Allies for protection. Sonnino, then at Versailles for the meeting of the Supreme War Council, protested that it was monstrous that men who had been fighting Italy until the last minute of the war should now haul down one flag and hoist another, and claim to be allies. 3 Italy’s case could hardly be challenged. Pola was occupied by Italian forces a few days later, and after much heated inter-Allied argument the Austro-Hungarian ships were turned over to Italian, French and American crews and disarmed. 1
