ABSTRACT
At the end of his chapter, Petschauer concludes that Putin invaded Ukraine because, as an authoritarian leader, he could do so; he concludes that “rare is the authoritarian leader who does not start a war!” He also thinks that Putin had calculated that the West would not interfere; that Western sanctions would not hurt Russia's economy; that the war would be a short one, providing a quick victory; and that he could act with impunity and without accountability, much as he had in other venues like Chechnya, Syria, Crimea, and, to a certain extent, the Donbas. Petschauer also considers a variety of other potential causative factors that might have contributed to Putin's personality. These includes Russian fear of encirclement, occasioned by invasions dating back to the 17th and 18th centuries, Napoleon's invasion in the early 19th century, and culminating in the attacks of WWI and WWII. All were amplified by “restraining and holding abuses in childhood” reflective of common Russian childcare practice; being born into a transgenerationally traumatized family; turning to violence as a means of addressing the pain of transgenerational trauma; being overly protected in an authoritarian household; possible identification with heroic, larger-than-life Russian figures like Peter the Great that may have facilitated a sense of being powerful, superior, and chosen; small stature and a need to protect the self from feeling less than through acts of violence; and a desire to reestablish the lost empire the Soviet Union. Petschauer also argues that Putin viewed NATO's move towards the east and Ukraine's push westward as twin threats to Russian stability. Causation for Petschauer, then, is not simple. It encompasses a broad array of psychological, cultural, and historical factors that he sees as making their own unique contribution to Putin's behavior.
