ABSTRACT
The purpose of this chapter is to juxtapose a Buddhist theory of (No)-Self with a feminist theory of moral subjectivity. The point of placing these two traditions side by side is to help expose residual sources of ‘mastery’ or ‘grasping’ that may linger in each and obstruct their (respective) goals of ‘compassion’ and ‘care” Both Buddhist and feminist re-conceptualization of subjectivity can be viewed as ‘particularizing’ moves. Yet, they are particularizations in different senses. According to a certain strand in feminism, the Rational Self is a theoretical abstraction to be replaced by socially embedded and embodied ‘particular’ or ‘concrete’ selves. Buddhism also calls the self a ‘fiction’, but its positive move consists in dismantling the ‘I’ into causally interacting bundles of particulars (skandhas). These two significantly different processes of deconstructing prevalent notions of self-identity are both intended to provide a grounding to transcend selfish egoism – which is ‘care’ in the case of a particular brand of feminist theory and ‘compassion’ in Buddhism. Could a feminist profit from the Buddhist strategy? And do Buddhists have any need to pay heed to feminist arguments? In attempting to answer these questions, the chapter does not assume either feminism or Buddhism to be monolithic. It focuses on the feminist theory of subjectivity that emerges from an ‘ethic of care’. In Buddhist analysis of moral subjectivity, I draw on Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra .
