Introduction

Following the lead of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet media have been seeking to portray the policy decisions taken at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February–March 1986 as a major ‘turning point’ in Soviet history. Such an impression is undoubtedly desired by Gorbachev and his colleagues, and it is probably true that a significant proportion of the Soviet is ready for major changes. Whether or not the policies actually announced or introduced during and after the congress represent a real turning point, however, remains to be seen. The essays assembled in the present volume, some of which were presented at a workshop on the 27th Party Congress at the Australian National University in April 1986, consider this question for a number of policy areas and from a variety of perspectives. The authors seek to examine the degree to which the policy initiatives and associated personnel changes brought forth by Gorbachev and his lieutenants in certain key areas — domestic politics, general economic policy and administration, agriculture, ideology and foreign policy — constitute substantial innovations. Proceeding from their analyses, the authors also attempt to evaluate the potential of Gorbachev’s proposals for achieving the intended transformational impact.