ABSTRACT
Broadly understood, perfectionism is the view that the state may, or should, promote valuable conceptions of the good life and discourage conceptions that are bad or worthless. This chapter distinguishes between two types of perfectionist theory: comprehensive perfectionism and moderate perfectionism. Comprehensive perfectionism claims that perfectionism should be grounded in some comprehensive moral doctrine, while moderate perfectionism claims that perfectionism does not have to be based upon any comprehensive moral doctrine. Moderate perfectionism also contends that in justifying the use of political power, citizens and state officials may appeal to judgments about the good life that are piecemeal, convincing, widely accepted, and not highly controversial. This chapter provides some reasons for favoring moderate perfectionism and defends it against criticisms made by Steven Wall and Collis Tahzib. In addition, this chapter clarifies the nature and limits of moderate perfectionism through a discussion of Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism.
