ABSTRACT
The successes and failures of British foreign policy during the 1930s, and within it the question of Britain's military preparations, have been some of the most debated historical topics since the opening of the records of the Cabinet under the ‘thirty years rule’ in the late 1960s. The main issues and constraints upon policy which they revealed was identified almost at once, in 1971, by Professor Michael Howard in his Ford Lectures, subsequently published as The Continental Commitment. 1 By now, it must surely rank as one of the most remarkable historical surveys in our times, alike for its insights, the durability of its main conclusions and its style. Professor Howard suggested that there were six main factors, the interplay of which determined the Cabinet's policies in respect of rearmament. Five of these have since been treated in detailed monographs, largely confirming and amplifying his own conclusions. The six factors suggested by Professor Howard were: (1) the role of economic considerations in general and that of the Treasury in particular; (2) unrealistically high assessments of the destructive power of aerial bombardment; (3) fears about collapse of morale and social unrest in Britain as a consequence of the bombing of the civilian population; (4) the melancholy way in which the possession of a vast empire came to weigh on the mind of the Cabinet as a constraining and enervating factor rather than as a source of confidence; (5) the undemanding and dispirited performance of the army chiefs in planning, and above all pressing, for the creation of a substantial modern army capable of taking on Germany on land. 2
