ABSTRACT
On January 25, 1966, Secretary McNamara, testifying before a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1967–71 Strategic Weapons Programme, released a table. As it is seen from this table, a first strike by the United States will result, in theory at least, in a lower loss of life. The difficulty of arms limitation is that there is, perhaps, no central design by the political or military leaders of the country to subjugate the world by destroying all opponents by a first strike. Neither is there a coherent military-industrial conspiracy to subvert the United States. The invention, development, testing, evaluation, procurement and deployment of strategic weapons have economic and political ramifications that must be included in accounting for the proliferation of strategic weapons systems in the United States. Certainly, one of the most potent factors that maintain the momentum of the arms race is technological innovation and discovery.
