ABSTRACT
This article outlines the effects of direct democracy on the Swiss political system. It deals with referendums initiated by petition ‘from below’ and with their indirect impact on politics and policy-making. Political elites sought to craft integrative strategies in order to tame the conflictual potential of these inherently majoritarian mechanisms. It is argued that this adaptive behaviour took three forms, the first two aiming to prevent recourse to direct democracy, and the last to steer the processes it engenders: widening the executive formula, to encompass all parties likely to make efficient use of the referendum if not co-opted as partners in the governing coalition; anticipation of the veto risk by negotiating ex-ante with opponents to policy reforms that were triggered by government and parliament; ex-post negotiation when the use of direct democracy could not be prevented, as in the case of popular initiatives. Finally, the limits of this neo-institutionalist approach are explored, before concluding with an assessment of the validity of the traditional functions of direct democracy today.
