ABSTRACT
The watershed in establishing the special relationship was Israel's military victory in 1967, which not only increased Israel's strategic importance but created a new political and strategic situation in the Middle East, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. American policy towards Israel was never formulated in a political, social and ideological vacuum. Confronted with a recalcitrant regional landscape, the administration ultimately became predisposed, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, to abandon its original perception of Israel 'as an obstacle to the attainment of American objectives'. The subsequent 'reassessment' posture, which was initiated in late March 1975 by the Ford administration in view of the failure of its initial mediating effort, was viewed by Kissinger as a means of softening the Israeli position through 'the threat of economic pressure and diplomatic isolation'. The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's prime minister provided yet another impetus for accelerating the shift from unity and consensus to dissent within the Jewish community.
