ABSTRACT

The issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Mediterranean area raises a dual problem of definition:

First, the range of weapons involved need to be defined. In the 1950s, the terminology used was NBC weapons (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons). Terminology has changed with military technology, however, and the more common term is now weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD), a more comprehensive term. In addition to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, this usually covers the devices which may be used to carry such weapons, including ballistic missiles, even though these carriers can be, and usually are, equipped with conventional munitions. It seems, however, illogical to place nuclear weapons and other weapons into the same category, as the former are deterrents and the latter are weapons intended for use. None the less, this conventional approach to definition will be maintained in this discussion, firstly because it forms the basis for today’s strategic debate, and secondly because as regards nuclear weapons in the region, the essential issue of debate is whether these weapons are, in fact, intended for use or merely as a deterrent.

The second part of the definitional problem, which is more difficult to resolve, is of a geographical nature. To take only the countries participating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) into consideration would be to oversimplify the matter. This would leave out countries that, in the eyes of many of the parties involved, form an integral part of the regional strategic equation, and often constitute an undeniable threat to their security. Israel could not conceive of a system of arms control that did not include Iran and Iraq. Indeed, these two countries feature high on the list of security concerns of other Euro-Mediterranean countries too, even though they are not, strictly speaking, included in the area. The Euro-Mediterranean area, specified in the Barcelona Process, is meaningful on a political, diplomatic and economic level, but not in strategic terms. Libya poses an altogether different type of problem. Paradoxically, the very reasons for which it was not included in the Barcelona Process originally are those which make its integration into an overall regional security system indispensable. Therefore, for this discussion to be relevant in terms of analysis at a strategic level, it must take into account a wider area than just that defined by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.