ABSTRACT
The Second World War was undoubtedly the defining conflict in the development of maritime air power. Although the roots were firmly bedded in the past, and notably in the First World War, it was the campaigns against the Axis powers between 1939 and 1945 that witnessed the establishment of air power as a crucial and decisive factor in determining the outcome of maritime campaigns. Moreover, in two particular cases maritime air power was critical to the conduct and indeed outcome of the war. Undoubtedly, for both the Allies and the Axis powers, success in anti-submarine warfare was a linchpin of victory. Both the Western Allies, Britain in particular, and Japan were heavily reliant on the use of merchant shipping and maritime lines of communication to feed production and facilitate any expanded war effort, while, conversely, opposing powers saw great opportunity and merit in limiting or closing such maritime lines of supply. For the British, the threat came from German U-boats and surface vessels operating predominantly in the North Atlantic, while for Japan the crucial theatre was to be the maritime network linking the home islands to the resource rich areas of South-east Asia. Air power was a critical factor in respective success and failure in both campaigns.
