ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that neither the separation nor the equal treatment conception engenders neutrality, at least in the context of education. It summarizes the Supreme Courts establishment clause jurisprudence: the Court’s belief that the purpose of the clause is to assure governmental neutrality, its two conceptions of neutrality, and the Lemon test. The chapter discusses the history of religion in the United States and the relationships of religious groups to government and to education and describes the Supreme Court’s conceptions of neutrality. It proposes political pluralism protects religious groups sufficiently so that the Court may relax its scrutiny, and suggests a less severe test for the Court to apply. Religious and governmental leaders seldom can foresee all of the effects of their policies. Until the mid-twentieth century, the American colonies and the United States had never witnessed a period of sustained religious political pluralism. Religious groups have many distinct interests, practices and beliefs that are affected by governments’ educational policies.
