ABSTRACT
There has been much recent discussion concerning the relation between Parfit's Reductionism and the view of persons to be found in early Buddhism and Abhidharma. Some have claimed that Parfit is wrong to see in the Buddhist position an important anticipation of his own view—since the Buddhist view is not, as he supposes, Reductionist, but rather Eliminativist. 1 Others suggest that while certain of the Abhidharma schools might have held a Reductionist position, early Buddhism may defensibly be interpreted as Non-Reductionist in character. 2 It is something of a cliché among scholars of Buddhist and comparative philosophy that contemporary philosophical discussions would be enriched through greater familiarity with the Buddhist philosophical tradition. If such claims are to be taken seriously, then we should at least be clear about how the Buddhist philosophical problematic maps onto contemporary discussions. Further, we need to demonstrate, through concrete case studies, that Buddhist resources can facilitate genuine progress on current disputes. I shall here propose a taxonomy of views on persons and personal identity that I believe helps clarify the relations among the various Buddhist and contemporary positions on these issues. I shall also seek to show that when we develop a taxonomy that accommodates both traditions, certain of the currently held positions come to appear more plausible.
