ABSTRACT
Matilal's recent work, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge , is a welcome addition to the growing body of works which seek not merely to explicate the theories and arguments of classical Indian philosophers but also to continue the philosophical conversation by examining such work in the light of the theories and methods of the current philosophical community. Matilal's subject is, broadly, the Nyāya defense of the school's realism about perception against its critics, chiefly the Buddhists and Mimāṃsakas. I shall here take issue with Matilal on just one aspect of this broad debate — the exchange between Nāgārjuna and Nyāya over the possibility of pramāṇavāda. I shall argue that Matilal misinterprets Nāgārjuna's position in this exchange, so that his Nyāya-style response misses the point of the Madhyamaka criticism. This is important not just for exegetical reasons, but because we should want to continue the discussion begun by these philosophers some 1800 years ago.
