ABSTRACT
It seems unavoidable that, if we take the idea of moral rights seriously, then we have to countenance the possibility that an individual may have a moral right to do something that is, from the moral point of view, wrong. Consider, for example, the following actions.
Someone uses all the money that he has won fairly in a lottery to buy racehorses and champagne and refuses to donate any of it to a desperately deserving charity.
An individual joins or supports an organization which he knows has racist leanings, such as the National Front in the United Kingdom; he canvasses support for it among a credulous electorate, and he exercises his own vote in its favor.
Somebody offers deliberately confusing, though not untrue, information about the policies of a political party to a confused and simpleminded voter in an attempt to influence his vote.
An athlete takes part in sports competition with the representatives of an oppressive or racist state, despite the fact that this profoundly demoralizes those who are struggling for the liberalization of that state.
Antiwar activists organize a rowdy demonstration near a cenotaph service on Remembrance Day.
A man refuses to give a stranger in the street the time of day when he asks for it or coldly and rudely rebuffs attempts at conversation in a railway compartment.
Someone refuses to consider evidence that might call in question his or her fundamental opinions and beliefs about the world; for instance, a biblical fundamentalist refuses even to look at the evidence of the fossil record.
