Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning

From very early days down to the present time the essential nature of trusts and other equitable interests has formed a favorite subject for analysis and disputation. The classical discussions of Bacon ¹ and Coke are familiar to all stu lents of equity, and the famous definition of the great chief justice (however inadequate it may really be) is quoted even in the latest textbooks on trusts. ² That the subject has had a peculiar fascination for modern legal thinkers is abundant'y evidenced by the well known articles of Langdell ³ and Ames, ⁴ by the oft-repeated observations of Maitland in his Lectures on Equity, ⁵ by the very divergent treatment of Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence, ⁶ by the still bolder thesis of Salmond in his volume on jurisprudence, ⁷ and by the discordant utterances of Mr. Hart ⁸ and Mr. Whitlock ⁹ in their very recent contributions to our periodical literature.