ABSTRACT
Typically, the set of elements defining a crime comprise what may be called the paradigm of liability for that offense: An actor is criminally liable if and only if the state proves all these elements. The paradigm of an offense, however, does not always determine criminal liability. Like the defenses of insanity, duress, and law enforcement authority, which also generally appear outside the definition of an offense, these rules of imputation alter the requirements for criminal liability. American criminal law permits the imputation of both the objective and culpability elements of a crime. The development of a rational and consistent theoretical framework is the first step toward a rational and consistent criminal law. Under a rational and principled criminal law, analogous rules should have analogous requirements and analogous results. A cumulative-culpability theory, however, does not justify doctrines in which the basis for the actor's liability for the crimes of another is not necessarily criminal in itself.
