ABSTRACT

In 2010 the decisive battle of Tannenberg will be commemorated in many countries, above all in Poland (as the battle of Grunwald) and Lithuania (as the battle of Žalgiris), but also by other nations whose soldiers had fought in 1410 in the victorious armies and so contributed to the defeat of the Teutonic Order in Prussia, hitherto the dominant power in the east of Central Europe. 1 This paper will reflect on power politics in the months preceding the battle and their consequences for the all-important recruitment of mercenaries and thus for the outcome of the conflict. Despite the enormous amount published on this famous battle over the course of the last century-and-a-half, it is still worth examining more closely old stereotypical theses, some of which have proved to be wrong, 2 and to look for new or unconsidered sources, especially in the archives of the Teutonic Order in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin. 3