ABSTRACT
The ability of a country to regulate extraterritorially depends not simply on rules of prescriptive jurisdiction, but also on rules of judicial jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. Once you start to see the structural rules of transnational law as a package, you begin to notice interesting things about the power dynamics of extraterritorial regulation. First, it becomes clear that a "big" country like the United States is better able to apply its laws extraterritorially, because a foreign defendant is likely to have more contacts with the United States. Second, in the areas of prescriptive and judicial jurisdiction, unilateral changes to these rules can increase a country's ability to regulate extraterritorially. Third, however, a country cannot increase its ability to regulate extraterritorially by making unilateral changes in its rules for the enforcement of judgments. Regulating extraterritorially with nonjudicial sanctions is not always practical.
