ABSTRACT
David Hume's words carry a distinct flavour of timeliness when read in the light of present-day debates concerning soft law. The term soft law, thus delimited, denotes those instruments which are to be considered as giving rise to legal effects, but do not amount to real law. The soft law thesis rests on shaky presumptions and finds but meagre support in both state practice and judicial practice. State practice concerning soft law appears to be rather limited. If state practice concerning soft law is, at its very best, ambiguous, what then about judicial practice? A similar picture emerges from a look at some domestic cases where soft law instruments have been applied. It can easily be conceded that international tribunals have sometimes applied instruments usually deemed to be of a soft law character. Moreover, the soft law thesis is not even necessary: the traditional binary conception of law is well capable of performing the functions usually ascribed to soft law.
