ABSTRACT
This chapter explains how political liberalism, as distinguished from comprehensive forms of liberalism, reduces the tension between the need for minimal civic virtue and the existence of reasonable moral pluralism in modern liberal democracies. It aims to challenge the neorepublican thesis that a common conception of the good based on patriotism must support the practice of good citizenship and offers an alternative, derived from John Rawls's idea of public reason, that attempts to accommodate the moral, religious, and cultural beliefs of reasonable but nonliberal citizens. The chapter shows that being reasonable, for political purposes, does not require a commitment to deep ethical autonomy and puts forth a model of civic education that relies on much weaker conception of autonomy that is less likely to threaten nonliberal ways of life. It shows why normative political theory is indispensable in helping to determine where lines should be drawn in legal controversies that involve requests by minority groups for cultural or religious accornmodation.
