ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the possible bearing of John Rawls' work on a debate in legal scholarship concerning the value and defensibility of any attempt at systematic normative argumentation. In Political Liberalism, the influential moral philosopher Rawls attempts in part to justify a particular, liberal conception of justice by arguing that it is the conception which best corresponds to the way we perceive our powers and motivations when we behave politically. Rawls' use of the original-position construct exemplifies the form of justificatory argument that he labels political constructivist. A constructivist argument pivots on a "procedure of construction" or a "device of representation." Rawls directs Political Liberalism in part to the justification of a particular "political conception of justice" that he calls "justice as fairness." A political conception of justice, such as justice as fairness, is of course meant to supply higher-order criteria for lawmaking, both constitutional and ordinary.
