ABSTRACT
Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach, as articulated in Frontiers of Justice, is explicitly framed to correct the deficiencies she finds in prominent theories of equality. This chapter argues that despite certain weaknesses, her theory provides support for a richer form of equality than John Rawls' theory of "justice as fairness". It examines the social model of disablement and its implications for equality rights. The chapter discusses the social model of disablement to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach, and considers the extent to which that approaches can provide guidance on critical jurisprudential questions facing Canadian courts. It reviews the social model of disablement, which has close links to Nussbaum's vision of disability rights. The chapter suggests that the Granovsky v. Canada decision's interpretation of dignity betrays an impoverished conception of equality, and deeper problems that constitutional law theorists have raised with respect to the dignity test.
