ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that law as jurisprudence, unlike naturalist and positivist conceptions of law, entails a conception of the legal system as inherently comparable. The legal systems of law as jurisprudence thus are "systems" in their own right, that is, systems that combine, rather than merely juxtapose, the synthetic and organic systematicities of law under naturalism and positivism. William Ewald, in particular, has offered a powerful account of law "as jurisprudence" and suggested that we correspondingly think of comparative law "as comparative jurisprudence." As the legal system is comparable under law as jurisprudence, it is possible to take up Ewald's suggestion and think of comparative law as comparative jurisprudence, as "the comparative study of the intellectual conceptions that underlie the principal institutions of one or more foreign legal systems." Comparative law indeed stands a chance to buck its instrumental destiny and blossom into a self-standing academic discipline, one that is distinct, in particular, from law in general and legal philosophy.
