ABSTRACT
In his essay, Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin ranges widely over a variety of issues in legal and political theory and practice. He develops his ideas through a series of controversies with other writers. Most commentators and author suspect most readers, himself included, took Dworkin to be advocating what is essentially a hybrid theory: a communication model of source-based law and a coherence model of the rest. The author described the theory commonly attributed to Dworkin in seventies as a hybrid theory combining communication and coherence models. This combination has a political logic of its own: it represents a conservative political view of the role of judiciary. Dworkin is rightly critical of theories of adjudication which advocate that courts should not engage in moral argument. He joins Kelsen, Hart and other legal positivists in arguing that such a judicial policy is not merely undesirable, it is impossible to pursue. Dworkin in this argument relies upon two important features of intention.
