ABSTRACT

This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's treatment of human dignity in the Metaphysics of Morals. It concentrates on the Metaphysics of Morals and refers to Kant's other works only by way of further clarification. The difference between the human being within the system of nature and the human being as a person is the same as the difference between the homo phenomenon and the homo noumenon. The decisive characteristic of the homo noumenon is his freedom. Conscience and moral sentiment are necessary components of freedom and establish the character of a human being as a person, from which human dignity follows. The moral imperative does not describe the world as do the laws of nature, but rather it prescribes something. The moral imperative also shares formalism with the principles of logic. The human being would no longer be perceived as an intellectual being, with only the homo phenomenon, the animal rationale, the rational natural being remaining.