ABSTRACT
The tercentenary of the death of Grotius—he died on 29 August 1645—passed almost unnoticed in the literature of international law. This chapter attempts to supply that perspective through an estimate of his teaching in the light of the enduring problems of international law. The standing of De Jure Belli ac Pacis as an authority relied upon in judicial decisions, national and international, has been higher and more persistent than that of any other of the founders of international law. International law proper forms merely a part—though the most important part—of a wider system. The law of nations proper—jus gentium voluntarium—is, of course, the product of consent as manifested in the practice of states. Grotius's jus gentium thus conceived is not synonymous with public international law. International law, in the three centuries which followed De Jure Belli ac Pacis, rejected the distinction between just and unjust wars.
