ABSTRACT
The Buchlerian tripartite theory of judgment frees judgment from its association with a narrow conception of reason and allows for parity of feeling and emotion in moral judgment. This chapter argues that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Traditionally, judgment has been identified with "reason" and conceived of as the making of logical, evidential, "impartial," or "legislative" inferences or the asserting and applying of universal principles and rules. Huck's judgment of sympathy is not irrational, even if it does not follow from a self-conscious assertion of principles. While Buchler's theory of judgment resonates with the catholicity of Dewey's concept of intelligence, it rejects "problemsolving" as too restricted for defining judgment. Buchler's tripartite theory of judgment provides conceptual language for articulating how other modes of judgment besides the assertive function, discriminate, and actualize the self.
