ABSTRACT
Most process-based constitutional theorists and their followers have seen little point in analyzing what the general acceptance of their views would be likely to do to the actual course of constitutional argument and decision. One difficulty that confronts process theories is the stubbornly substantive character of so many of the Constitution's most crucial commitments. Much of the Constitution does indeed appear to address matters of procedure. For those who would fill the gaps left by the Constitution's ambiguities and silences with representation-reinforcing principles, perhaps the core "process value" is the value of protecting certain minorities from perennial defeat in the political arena. In many of its parts, the Constitution also evinces a substantive commitment to the institution of private property and to the contractual expectations that surround it. In deciding constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has often invoked a vision of how politics should work, justifying judicial intervention as a response to supposed gaps between that vision and political reality.
