ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that in De Officiis justice is 'mistress and queen' in two ways: first, it is the most important of the four primary virtues; secondly, it helps to define the other virtues, which must be limited by it. De Officiis contains the earliest theory of justice that explicitly defines justice as that which builds up society. The chapter shows that the resulting conception of justice is very different from anything. It explores how Cicero came to articulate this view: is he merely transcribing a theory developed by someone else and appropriate to a different historical context? The 'domina et regina virtutum' retains her crown throughout the three books of De Officiis. If Books I and II emphasise the role of justice, Book III relies almost exclusively upon it. The formula or 'rule of procedure' which is to be used in deciding the problematic causae of the book is based upon the account of the naturalness of societas.
