ABSTRACT
The pluralism and secularism characteristic of most modern liberal conceptions of the political order are manifestations of another more fundamental characteristic of the liberal conception, that is, the neutrality of the political order. Several features of the place of neutrality within theoretical liberalism seem to be especially important. R. A. Markus' view depends on his interpreting the empirical 'pluralism' and 'secularism' of Augustine's mature conception of the state as anticipating the neutrality that is often a key feature of modern theoretical political liberalism. Augustine does frequently speak of political authority as 'restraining the wicked' and 'restraining evil desires. The effect of theoretical liberalism's commitment to neutrality is to privatize conceptions of the good. Like many claims of utility, the claim that a context of neutrality is most conducive to 'truth winning out' is a factual claim that would be terribly difficult to sustain in empirical terms.
