ABSTRACT
In this chapter Hill presents the origins and character of Locke’s thinking about language. He shows that Locke’s famous turn to language in Book Three of the Essay appeared early in the composition of Draft A and was motivated by non-skeptical concerns about lexical reliability. Hill then shows how the development of the distinction between real and nominal essences underlay a robustly normative response to the problem, one which revolves around the principle of ‘having a right to a name,’ in the published versions of Book Three. Next, Hill turns to the central semantic doctrine of Locke’s account, signification, and supports Ashworth’s Scholastic analysis of that doctrine in Locke. Ashworth’s Scholastic analysis as applied to Locke’s principle of signification – the principle that words signify things mediately and ideas immediately – is then shown to cohere with the robustly normative approach previously described through the dual-aspect ‘secret reference’ language users impose on their ideas (3.2.4). Hill then argues that this conception of language as a set of normative aspects imposed on ideas is the key to balancing the mentalistic restrictions to signification without also trapping language users inside their own minds and behind merely ideational referents. It is hoped that by bringing the normative character and function of Locke’s conception of language to the forefront of our reading of 3.1–6 a fuller and more nuanced understanding and appreciation of the philosophical power and role of Locke’s thinking within his doctrine of ideas become possible.
