ABSTRACT
Present day psychological continuity theorists of personal identity start with a reading of Locke as a memory theorist and amend his view to avoid standard objections to this view. While these updated theories do avoid some serious worries that apply to a simple memory account, psychological continuity theorists remain vulnerable to the complaint that their views do not account for the practical significance of personal identity. I argue that this is because these theories employ an outdated and oversimplified picture of how memory connections work. Focusing on two recent developments in the psychological study of memory, I propose an updated memory theory that has the potential to avoid this serious objection. This account does not do the same philosophical work that psychological continuity theories seek to do and requires that we reframe the question we are asking. By describing an intimate relation between memory, consciousness, and personal identity, however, it captures some of the crucial insights of Locke’s account, and shows why it remains relevant and influential.
