ABSTRACT
J. P. Sartre moves from an abstract analysis of the universal structures of modes of being towards increasingly concrete, ontic claims about specific features of individuals and how they relate to others, where the later ontic features “arise within” the former ontological structures. Sartre’s analysis of the mode of being for-itself (BFI) proves considerably more complex and difficult to trace. Sartre recognizes that this twisted phrase requires a non-standard use of the verb ‘to be’ and, in many ways, Being and Nothingness is well understood as a fundamental rethinking of the mode of being of human reality. Sartre revises his purely non-egological account of pre-reflective consciousness, because the objectifying modifications constitute a self or quasi-ego that “haunts” pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre’s discussion wanders around, repeats itself and Sartre sometimes gives incomplete arguments with important details discussed later. Sartre then goes on to show that BFI must be aware of its freedom and that when the awareness becomes explicit anxiety ensues.
