ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the implications of Iris Murdoch’s distinctive conception of moral perception as a form of ‘vision’ for the robust realist claim that salient concepts of an individual’s life-world can be revelatory of value. I argue that there is an essentially relational dimension to realistic and continuous self-cultivation in concept application that is helpfully understood in terms of virtue. This, if I am right, brings into view a new perspective on opportunities for self-cultivation for the ‘inner’ moral life that moves beyond both the Aristotelian influence in virtue theory, which states that character formation largely takes place in childhood, in a way that also complements developmental perspectives on character in the psychological literature. I also argue that Murdoch’s notion of moral attention in creating opportunities for self-cultivation in ‘just and loving’ vision does not reduce down to a Kantian-like respectful recognition of autonomy or rational agency of others as such. The reason is that love requires moral attentiveness to the reality of particular others, on account of which one can also address oneself in an authentic way. Herein lies also the ethical significance of attunement as a virtue.
