ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an interpretation of Kant’s oft-cited but little understood claim that finite rational agents have to overcome their motivational self-opacity in order to cultivate a virtuous disposition. According to Kant, finite rational agents are motivationally self-opaque in the sense that, even when doing what they ought to, they cannot be sure of the moral worthiness of their motives. It is argued that, by this, Kant does not mean that finite rational agents cannot be sure whether the maxim they decided to act on is indeed the motive of the ensuing action. For if it did, self-opacity would make acting altogether impossible, and moral self-cultivation would be the least of Kant’s worries. Instead, it is suggested that Kant means the following: even when doing what they ought to, finite rational agents cannot be sure whether, given less favourable circumstances, they would have done the same, or whether they would have succumbed to error, meaning that their moral conduct in this was a lucky coincidence. This kind of uncertainty, it is argued, stands in the way of moral self-cultivation because, without awareness of one’s liabilities to error, it is easy to conceal errors and inconsistencies and go on as before, without even acknowledging the need for change.
