ABSTRACT
In this chapter, we argue that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics provides the seeds for an illuminating and convincing account of ethical self-cultivation as a form of habituation. In order to do so, we examine a number of potential objections to the neo-Aristotelian account, which have inspired alternative approaches, or even outright sceptical responses, to the idea of self-cultivation. We begin by discussing the objection that virtue ethics construes self-cultivation too narrowly in moral terms, and show that this is based on a confusion (even though it should be admitted that much empirical research inspired by the virtue ethical tradition suffers from this narrow focus). Secondly, we argue against the idea that habituation cannot account for ethical self-cultivation because it is a form of blind conditioning. We outline an alternative account of habituation as a reason-based, self-conscious activity. Finally, we respond to the potential worry that the neo-Aristotelianism does not have room for a notion of self-development after childhood. We argue that, on the contrary, if such self-development consists in rational habituation, as we suggest, it must necessarily be understood as an ongoing, lifelong process.
