ABSTRACT
In his well-known Abstract of a Book Lately Published from 1740, Hume sets out to explain the chief argument that dominates his first masterpiece, the Treatise of Human Nature. Perhaps surprisingly we find him directing us to a short passage in Leibniz’s Theodicy in which Leibniz discusses a certain lacuna in the field of logic that needs urgent attention. How sincere is Hume when he announces that the Treatise had been conceived as a response to Leibniz’s call for a new logic that dealt with inductive or causal reasoning? How correct is Hume when he further suggests that his proposal constitutes a new line of thought not considered by philosophers before him? This chapter examines the possibility that Leibniz was more than a distant source of inspirations to Hume, but that Leibniz in spite of differences in philosophical temperament had left behind valuable resources both in the form of rational principles and psychological insights Hume is able to draw on. So what possible sway may Leibnizian considerations have had on the ideas Hume expresses in the Treatise, and in particular what did Hume take away from Leibniz’s conception of logic and reasoning, and his treatment of demonstrable and probable inferences? I argue that on close examination there is recognizable Leibnizian content in Hume’s presentation of human thought processes.
