ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses some examples of rules that can highlight the heterogeneous character of our normative practice, which tempted, too hastily perhaps, to label generally as "rule-following." It discusses some criticisms of Wittgenstein that were proposed by his student and follower Rush Rhees, who has shown that some important distinctions applied to our linguistic practice do not tally with the difference between following and violating a rule. The chapter applies Rhees' criticisms in a broader context, reflecting on a variety of normative practices and shows that some explicit statements of rules do not serve the purpose of describing a practice that actually follows the rule that was made explicit. Wittgenstein's lists of language-games often include storytelling or joking, but for a closer inquiry of the rules of language games he typically doesn't choose these as an example. The rules of Scouting are teleological and express a direction for a particular kind of care for one's soul, unlike School Regulations.
