ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the inferentialist philosophy of language, or inferentialism as philosophy, and inferentialism in the epistemology of testimony. The relations between theories of assertion and epistemology of testimony have been studied a great deal, but the connection between the two inferentialisms has been less in focus. An inferentialist philosopher of language like Robert Brandom or Jaroslav Peregrin holds the view that the meaning of a word consists in its inferential role and that language is normative in the sense that its vocabulary is governed by inferential rules. A normative inferentialist emphasizes the irreducibility of normative attitude; that attitude is the core of the game of giving and asking for reasons, and it amounts to treating our own and others' utterances as correct or incorrect. Miranda Fricker seeks to avoid intellectualism and therefore criticizes the inferentialists' view on testimonial knowledge. Fricker suggests that some mode of rational sensitivity is needed that yields spontaneous, noninferential judgments.
