ABSTRACT
The inferentialism of Brandom and Peregrin explains the notion of linguistic meaning by reference to rules governing communication. This chapter pursues the same idea, but draws directly on Wittgenstein rather than contemporary inferentialism. It defends the idea that the meaning of an expression is constituted by the rules for its correct use. The chapter assuages the qualm that linguistic meaning is ultimately a notion that would be better off without and addresses arguments against the idea that meaning has an essential normative dimension. It distinguishes those linguistic rules that are constitutive of meaning from others and spells out the idea of correct use in a way that is not unilluminatingly circular. Wittgenstein's strategy for clarifying meaning also appeals to how competent speakers understand an expression. The desideratum of identifying the semantically relevant features of use and the desideratum of pinpointing the normative dimension of meaning seem to stand in a potentially fatal tension.
