ABSTRACT
Jarda Peregrin's fabulous book Inferentialism brings into conversation two contemporary movements of thought that have hitherto had little to say to one another: inferentialism in semantics and inferentialism in logic. It embeds that conversation philosophically in a broader normative framework that articulates what is most distinctive of us as persons. The normative center of reasoning is the practice of assessing reasons for and against conclusions. Reasons for conclusions are normatively governed by relations of consequence or implication. Imposing Cut and Cautious Monotonicity as global structural constraints on material consequence relations amounts to equating the epistemic status of premises and conclusions. The structural constraint, the classical tradition for which Gentzen and Tarski speak, imposes on incompatibility relations is explosion: the requirement that from incompatible premises anything and everything follows. Substructural expressivist logics suitable for making explicit nonmonotonic, nontransitive material consequence and incompatibility relations are accordingly not far to seek.
