ABSTRACT
A central motivation for expressivism about logic has been to avoid a view of logical vocabulary as serving to map the layout of a special domain of facts whose bearing on discursive practice remains mysterious. Logical expressivists adopt, instead, a pragmatist stance: they seek to explain the role of logical vocabulary in terms of discursive practice. In the form pioneered by Robert Brandom and elaborated and extended by Jaroslav Peregrin, logical expressivism adopts a specific version of this stance. According to both philosophers, logical vocabulary lets us endorse broadly-speaking inferential relations, which are said to hold in virtue of socially instituted norms of discursive practice. Specifically, talk of consequence and incompatibility has such relations as its subject matter. And logical operators, such as conditionals and negation, give us an indirect way to endorse consequence and incompatibility relations. This chapter speaks about the components of Brandomian logical expressivism: implicit-content expressivism and inferential-attitude expressivism.
