ABSTRACT
The experience or phenomenology of free agency is more than a matter of sense-feeling experience. This is apparent even when one takes the term ‘sense-feeling’ in the widest possible way to cover not only all exteroceptive sensory experience and all interoceptive (kinaesthetic, proprioceptive, somatosensory) feelings, but also all moods and emotional feelings—all elements of all moods and feelings-that can be taken to be non-cognitive. Many analytic philosophers still reject the idea that there is any such thing as cognitive phenomenology, even when they allow that there is such a thing as phenomenology at all. Immanuel Kant’s views about the phenomenology of agency are of great interest in this connection. He holds that self-conscious agentive creatures like ourselves (‘rational beings’) can not help thinking of themselves as RF and UR, and that the reason this is so is that they experience themselves as subject to the moral law.
