Clearly, we normally suppose that often our beliefs and desires cause our intentions and that these cause our bodily movements. My belief that there is juice in the fridge and my desire to drink cause my intention to go to the fridge, which combined with my belief about the location of the fridge cause my legs to move my body in a way characteristic of walking in the direction in which I believe the fridge to be. We know that my legs would not move in the way characteristic of walking unless caused to do so by brain events causing other neural events causing contractions of my leg muscles, and so, for this to be caused by my mental events, the latter must first cause the necessary brain events. Similarly, we normally suppose that sensations often cause bodily effects, such as when an unpleasant taste or a loud noise causes me to wince or to complain to the owner of the restaurant, and we know that they could do so only by causing the brain events, which cause the wince or my uttering the words of complaint.