ABSTRACT
This chapter reconsiders Aristotle's tripartite division of human activity into theoretical activity, practical activity, and poietic activity or making. It examines whether Hegel's concept of thinking can, or cannot, sublate this division. Indirectly, this evaluation of the Aristotelian background has a bearing on the position we might want to take toward any pragmatist interpretation, since it allows us to challenge some of the assumptions guiding the actual debate. This may be such as the allegedly social normativity of thinking, the deflation of the metaphysical import of Hegel's process philosophy, and the alleged primacy of praxis over theory. The chapter firstly investigates the Aristotelian criterion of distinction among three kinds of human activity: again, theory, praxis, and making. Secondly, it analyzes the criterion by which Hegel reappraises Aristotle's distinction. Thirdly, the chapter discusses whether and how Hegel's process philosophy provides a reconstruction of theory and praxis.
